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This paper is the first to examine the effects of international bank mergers and acquisitions on 
acquirers' contribution to systemic risk covering the period from 1998 to 2015. Our sample 
consists of 608 international bank mergers, involved domestic and cross-border deals as well 
as conglomerate and non-conglomerate mergers. Using the Marginal Expected Shortfall (as in 
Acharya et al., 2017) as well as Conditional Value-at-Risk (as in Adrian and Brunnermeier, 
2016) as systemic risk measurements, we find that on average, mergers do not impact on the 
acquiring banks’ contribution to systemic risk regardless of the increased potential for risk 
diversification exhibited by cross-border and cross-industry bank mergers. Determinants that 
contributes to the decrease in acquirers’ systemic risk include product diversifying deals, deals 
conducted in a more concentrated banking system and a stable political environment. Whereas, 
for deals financed by cash only and much smaller compared to acquirers as well as involved 




A crucial regulatory lesson from the 2007-09 global financial crisis has been the 
prerequisite to devote greater attention to the financial stability because of the systemic risk 
faced by banks. Dilemmas with portfolios of subprime mortgages grew into a systemic crisis 
that deteriorated financial firms and markets all over the globe, triggering a severe economic 
recession. Consequently, building better protection against systemic risk has arisen as a 
regulatory priority, as has the goal of strengthening the macroprudential orientation of financial 
stability frameworks. The sub-prime mortgage lending in the US and the 2007-09 global 
financial crisis have also revived the enthusiasm of academics on these issues. It leads to the 
generation of a wide range of papers focusing on systemic risk measurement and its threats to 
the stability of the banking sector (see Acharya et al., 2017; Black et al., 2016; Maria et al., 
2016; Ellis et al., 2014). For instance, De Jonghe (2010) notices substantial heterogeneity in 
banks' contributions to the overall stability of banking industry. This finding is not surprising 
given the significant developments over the last three decades. Significant banking mergers 
and acquisitions, the abolition of the legal barriers to the unification of financial services, and 
technological advancement all affected the organisational design of banking institutions. These 
developments result in the emergence of very large and complex banking firms (the too-big-
to-fail) and financial conglomerates. De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) and De Nicolo, et al. (2004) 
argue that consolidation and conglomeration activities that create very large financial firms are 
important factors that increase systemic risk. Indeed, empirical studies that examine systemic 
risk issues related to bank or insurance M&A activities either by looking at firm’s expected 
short fall in undercapitalized market or information on firm’s stock and market index, indicate 
that systemic risk has increased in recent years due to consolidation trends (Lim et al., 2015; 
Mühlnickel and Weiß, 2015; Weiß et al., 2014). 
Extensive research about the effect of bank M&A on acquirers' contribution to systemic 
risk leads to mixed findings due to different samples, time frame, methodologies as well as 
parameters employed. Before the financial crisis, the so-called "concentration-stability" 
hypothesis which predicts that banking system concentration diminishes fragility has received 
supports theoretically by Diamond (1984), Allen & Gale (2000b, 2004a)  and empirically by 
Beck et al., (2006). Based on this hypothesis, large banks with high concentration are found to 
be less volatile because they might be more fruitful, easier to oversee, well-diversified and 
accordingly more flexible to market shocks. Promoters of the hypothesis also assert that bank 
M&A harmonises with a reduction in the bidders' default risk; hence systemic risk decreases, 
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and the financial soundness of the whole banking system is enhanced. In contrast, Winton 
(1999), Caminal and Matutes (2002) and  De Nicolo et al., (2004) defend the "concentration-
fragility" hypothesis and regard bank M&A as a probable cause for the increase in systemic 
risk. It is because the hypothesis anticipates more volatility associated with a concentrated 
banking structure with several large corporations. These corporations might take the excessive 
risk as a result of implicit "too big to fail" schemes or preferences with risk-expected return 
trade-off (Berger, 2000; Mishkin, 1999). Specifically, Mishkin (1999) proposes that with a 
high concentration degree, the few large banking institutions will obtain greater subsidies; thus 
likely escalating their risk-taking activities; hence resulting in higher insolvency risk.  
After the global financial crisis, substantial evidence was found for the significant 
increase in acquiring banks' contribution to systemic risk as a result of M&A (Weiß et al., 
2014). Similarly, Wagner (2010) asserts that diversification cause systemic crises more likely 
as financial institutions become more co-dependent because of similar business lines, common 
exposures and portfolios of investment following a merger. Also, bank mergers could be 
motivated by regulatory incentives to become too big to fail, thus increasing their contribution 
to systemic risk (see, e.g., Berger, 2000).  
These research controversies serve as motivations for this paper to investigate the 
effects of mergers and acquisitions on bidding banks’ contribution to systemic risk post-
merger. Employing a global sample of 608 bank M&A deals from 1998 to 2015, this paper 
applies two reliable, well-known and strong approaches: Marginal Expected Shortfall as in 
Brownlees and Engle (2012) and CoVaR as in Girardi and Tolga Ergün (2013)  to measure 
the contribution to systemic risk of bank mergers. Furthermore, it provides original evidence 
on the determinants of merger-related changes in bidding banks’ contribution to systemic risk.  
This paper provides three main contributions to the M&A literature. First, to the best 
of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the effects of bank mergers on bidders’ 
contribution to systemic risk covering the period between 1998 and 2015. While other papers 
examining the relationship between bank mergers and stability tend to employ sample only 
until the end of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, we argue that the motives for bank mergers 
and the effects of M&A activity might be different after the global financial crisis. Therefore, 
it might generate different results compared to what has been found in the existing literature. 
Indeed, we find that mergers and acquisitions, on average, do not impact on the acquiring 
banks’ contribution to systemic risk regardless of the increased potential for risk diversification 
exhibited by cross-border and cross-industry bank mergers. This result interestingly contradicts 
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various papers in the existing literature as they find that mergers increase bidders’ contribution 
to systemic risk (Molyneux et al., 2014; Mühlnickel and Weiß, 2015; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 
2009). As noted above, this sample period extends beyond the 2007-09 global financial crisis; 
hence banks may no longer merge to become too-big-to-fail and engage in excessive risk-
taking. Instead, they may pursue M&A for healthy growth, expansion of business lines and 
locations or acquisitions of new customer bases; thereby increase business profit and enhance 
the stability of the banking system. Therefore, the result from this sample is at best risk neutral. 
Second, this is the first paper to shed lights on the risk effects of product diversifications 
on acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk. Previous studies tend to investigate the influence 
of specific types of bank mergers on the bidder’s contribution to systemic risk such as bank 
consolidation as in Weiß et al., (2014), insurance consolidation as in Mühlnickel and Weiß 
(2015). By including mergers among banks and other non-bank institutions such as insurance 
companies, securities, brokerages and credit institutions, this sample may offer potentially 
large diversification benefits. These diversification benefits are further underpinned by many 
policy initiatives in many countries across the globe, aiming at promoting conglomerates which 
have substantially lowered the entry barriers for banks when engaging in product 
diversification. This paper hypothesises that product-diversifying mergers contribute more to 
the reduction in systemic risk than focusing deals because of the large potential of risk 
diversification benefits. We find that there is evidence that product-diversifying deals result in 
the reduction in acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk for non-US acquirers only. Therefore, 
the second hypothesis of this paper cannot be rejected.  
Third, this paper provides original evidence for the underlying factors that influence 
the changes in bidders' contribution to systemic risk. Specifically, we uncover that payment 
method, the status of target, relative size, HHI and political stability are all found to play 
important roles. However, payment method and relative size play bigger roles than the others. 
First, for deals financed by cash only, the acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk will increase. 
The results are consistent with the notion that deals which are fully paid for in cash are expected 
to raise acquiring banks' default risk as acquirers are replacing safe liquid assets (cash) with a 
riskier balance sheet of the target; thereby increasing acquirers' contribution to systemic risk 
(Furfine and Rosen, 2011). Second, the smaller the deal size in comparison with acquirers' 
market value, mergers will increase acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. This effect may be 
explained as small banks are motivated to engage in M&A with larger banks to gain an implicit 
bailout guarantee from the government which in turn increases overall systemic risk (Acharya 
and Yorulmazer, 2007). Regarding target's status, private targets prevent acquirers in realising 
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the systemic risk-reduction effect. In this concern, the literature supports the notion that merger 
deals involved in private targets are expected to generate risk-increasing effect for acquirers 
because private firms are subject to lower disclosure requirements; thus, it limits the acquirers' 
capabilities to evaluate the risks associated with private targets themselves as well as making 
bidders' due diligence ineffective. With regards to the macroeconomic environment of bidders, 
the more stable a political environment in an acquirer’ country before a merger, the greater the 
reduction of bidders’ contribution to systemic risk will be. Finally, the bank concentration 
index HHI has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. It implies that the more 
concentrated a banking system is, the more acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk will 
decrease, which is an initial signal of the ‘concentration-stability hypothesis’ as seen in Beck 
et al. (2006).  
The remaining paper will be organised as follow. The second section discusses the 
existing literature of the systemic risk's implications of bank mergers theoretically and 
empirically. The third section describes two robust and reliable models to compute bidders' 
contribution to systemic risk in this paper. We describe merger sample and data in section 3. 
A detailed analysis of the results is included in section 4 and follows a conclusion and study 
implications in section 5. 
2. Related literature 
The banking industry plays a significant role in every economy and is a principally 
significant segment for the stability of financial systems. Consequently, banking supervisors 
and regulators aim at providing the strength of the financial system and reducing the frequency 
and severity of potential financial vulnerability in the future. Trustworthy indicators of banking 
system welfare are of great importance. The academic literature so far has been debated with 
respect to the risk implications of bank mergers on acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk and 
the determinants of the changes in bidders’ systemic risk (see Bierth et al., 2015; Molyneux et 
al., 2014; Raffestin, 2014; Weiß et al., 2014).  
On the one hand, it is believed that M&A might have broadened the scope of 
diversification at individual firms; thus, reduce each institution's idiosyncratic risk which 
results in the reduction of the probability of default for individual firm and promote the 
financial soundness (De Nicolo and Kwast, 2002). Besides these advantages of functional 
diversification, Méon and Weill  (2005) argue that large banks undertaking cross-border M&A 
might gain more scale and scope economies via the geographical diversification of risk. Third, 
M&A activity makes banks gain more market power, thereby increase their franchise value. 
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As franchise value presents intangible asset that will only be secured if banking firms stay in 
business, such banks experience high opportunity costs when they fail and thereby becoming 
more hesitant to conduct risky transactions. Moreover, banks have the tendency to hold more 
capital, less risky portfolios and initiating smaller loan portfolio (Berger et al., 2009). By 
behaving more prudently, banks reduce their chance of getting into trouble and hence increase 
the stability of the whole banking system. Finally, by merging with many targets, an acquirer 
can become significantly larger, possess more complex business model and thus become more 
interconnected with more substantial number of counterparts in the banking system. 
Accordingly, banks have better coordination and higher motivation to provide liquidity to other 
troubled banks; hence lowering the risk of financial contagion in interbank markets and 
enhance banking stability (see Allen and Gale, 2000; Northcott, 2004). 
Empirical evidence from Berger et al. (2009) suggests that banks are more likely to 
hold higher capital buffers since the global financial crisis (2007-09) or use other mechanisms 
to reduce risks to possess safer portfolios; thereby implies that recent bank M&A may produce 
safer banks overall. Chu (2015) investigates banking mergers and stability in Canada from the 
early period 1867 and 1935 and support the concentration-stability view. Employing numerous 
empirical methodology and procedures, they show that only one out of 27 bankruptcies during 
this period was acquirers, while other acquiring banks grew significantly in market share and 
size. More specifically, geographic diversification is one of the primary factors that reduce the 
risk for a bank and contribute to banking stability, as two-thirds of 33 consolidations were 
cross-province deals. Besides, other institutional factors such as barriers to entry produced by 
the legal requirements for banks' paid-up capital, double-liability provision of bank 
shareholders, the absence of both central bank and an explicit deposit insurance scheme are 
factors that enhance banking system stability. All those determinants operate collectively to 
encourage banks to protect their charter values by restricting from excessive risk-taking, 
although how they interact and ensure banking stability still benefits future research. The 
author, therefore, sees the merger waves in Canada as the emergence of a highly concentrated 
but stable banking system.    
On the other hand, bank M&As is one of the critical causes of the increase in acquirers' 
contribution to systemic risk, which is defended by a number of recent empirical studies (see, 
e.g., Campa and Hernando, 2008; Kane, 2000; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009; Weiß et al., 2014). 
The first argument in support of this view is that a bank may pursue M&As to become "too big 
to fail" and thereby, is often more probable to obtain government's safety net or subsidies. The 
presence of these public guarantees can also result in moral hazard problem that stimulates 
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larger banks' managers to engage in high-risk investments which, in turn, may destabilise the 
whole banking system (Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009 ). More importantly, bank M&As may 
make joint collapses of borrowers more probable, this can lead to the vulnerability of the whole 
banking system (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2006). Third, Cetorelli et al. (2007) point out that larger 
banks via M&As with a higher level of risk diversification might lead to lower managerial 
efficiency, less effective internal company monitoring, higher control problems concerning 
customer base as well as increasing operational risk. These supervisory failures may increase 
the likelihood of individual banks' collapse as well as the increase in the contribution to 
systemic risk of acquirers. Under cross-border bank mergers, these problems are even more 
severe, mainly when it involves regulatory arbitrage. Banking firms can relocate their activities 
geographically, thereby shifting their poorly controlled risk to the taxpayers in other nations 
which can destabilise the entire banking system (Weiß et al., 2014).  
Empirical studies looking into international bank mergers tend to confirm the 
concentration fragility hypothesis. To start with, De Nicolo et al. (2004) highlight the positive 
connection between banking sector vulnerability and market concentration employing the Z-
core methodology in their sample of 500 largest banks and financial corporations globally in 
90 countries. More specifically, more significant and conglomerates corporations did not 
obtain substantially higher levels of profitability than smaller and more specialised companies. 
Also, larger corporations with a broader range of financial activities were more leveraged and 
did not obtain lower return volatility than smaller and more specialised companies. Therefore, 
it proposes that the determinants creating motivations for banks to take on more risk tend to 
outweigh the risk reductions expected from geographic and product diversification as well as 
attained via economies of scale or scope. In a more recent empirical study by Weiß et al. (2014), 
the concentration-fragility hypothesis is further confirmed by examining their sample of 
international bank mergers (excluding securities, insurance companies) between 1991 and 
2009. They find that after mergers, the combined entities' and their competitors' contribution 
to systemic risk increase. They support their hypotheses that the existence of banks owned by 
governments, the explicit deposit insurance as well as the hubris of bank managements are the 
primary determinants for the destabilising effect of bank M&As on the financial industry. 
Empirical evidence from European sample reports the same consensus. Uhde and 
Heimeshoff (2009) study the consolidated balance sheet data over the EU-25 between 1997 
and 2005 to investigate the relationship between consolidation in banking and financial 
stability in Europe. The results show that the national banking market concentration poses 
negative effect on European financial stability as estimated by the Z-score method while 
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controlling for bank-specific, regulatory, institutional and macroeconomic factors. The 
negative connection between concentration and stability is driven by higher return volatility of 
larger banks in concentrated markets. Molyneux et al., (2014), on the other hand, study the 
systemic risk implications of banking institutions that are considered too-big-to-fail to capture 
safety net subsidy effects and evaluate their impact on systemic risk. Employing a sample of 
European bank mergers in 9 countries from 1997 to 2007, they reveal that safety net advantages 
obtained from merger activity have a significantly positive connection with governmental 
rescue probability, implying moral hazard in the banking systems. Besides, substantial 
evidence is obtained that merger premiums are paid to achieve safety net subsidies that have 
detrimental systemic risk implications. Lastly, they estimate traditional measures of systemic 
risk by investigating the connection between safety net subsidy effects and interdependency 
between too big to fail banks post-merger. Unexpectedly, no significant connection has been 
found which indicates that safety net subsidies are not associated with stock price return 
correlations for too big to fail banks. This finding cast doubts on the competency of using stock-
return correlations as an appropriate indicator of systemic risk in the banking industry. To 
conclude, cross-border M&As within the EU may also complicate issues further as 
uncertainties regarding the jurisdiction of national safety net arrangements and coordination 
problems between regulators may arise (Hagendorff et al., 2012). 
In conclusion, because economic theory and empirical evidence are inconclusive about 
the impact of bank mergers on banking stability, it motivates this paper to bring the debates to 
an end and therefore offers advice to banking regulators and supervisors regarding the 
implications of bank M&A on the stability of the whole banking system. 
3. Data 
The following section outlines the data used in the empirical study. We first present the 
data on bank mergers and then discuss in detail on the data used in our cross-sectional 
regressions based on deal characteristics, acquirer characteristics and macroeconomic factors. 
3.1 Mergers 
The selected sample of bank mergers and acquisitions is gathered from Bloomberg 
Terminal and contains merger announcement date falling between 1998 and 2015. The reason 
for gathering merger deals from 1998 is to capture the effects of product diversification on the 
sample fully because the Financial Services Modernisation Acts of 1999 in the US voided the 
barriers on commercial and investment banks consolidating with securities companies and 
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insurance firms written in sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall Act. Since US acquirers 
constitute a significant number in the sample, large diversification effects on bank risk may be 
observed. The sample is extended to mergers announced in 2015 to study the most up to date 
merger deals which predicts to generate exciting results because the sample extends the 
literature by examining deals in a period long after the 2007-09 global financial crisis. 
Acquiring banks are located worldwide. Acquirers can be bank holding companies, 
commercial banks and credit institutions, meanwhile, target banks might also be life and 
accident insurance companies, mortgage banks, investment companies and securities 
companies. Acquiring banks are listed with equity returns and accounting data available on 
Bloomberg. The method of payments can be cash or stock or both cash and stock. Deals that 
contain default bank as a failing bank will be omitted, and it will be verified via Bloomberg or 
press coverage around the deal. 
Based on these criteria above, the initial sample contains 3,130 deal observations. 
Besides, it is essential that the acquisition is completed and is not categorized as private 
acquisitions, liquidation, bankruptcy, restructuring, privatisation, reverse takeover, repurchase, 
leveraged buyout and minority stock purchase. As a result, the sample reduces to 2,940 deals. 
Additional criteria are required to ensure that all deals in the sample have a potential impact on 
acquirers' probability of default. For instance, only deals with the time elapsed between the 
date of announcement and the completion date less than one year will be selected (Vallascas 
and Hagendorff, 2011). As a result, the sample reduces to 2,863 deals. Also, deals where 
acquirers purchase at least 50% of the target banks and the acquiring banks' ownership of target 
banks following mergers exceeds 90% will be chosen (Koerniadi et al., 2015). Hence, 204 
acquisitions are omitted as a consequence of this criterion. Furthermore, it is expected that only 
target with a substantial size in comparison with acquirer size may have an impact on the 
default risk of acquiring banks. Therefore, the ratio of deal size to acquirer's total assets is at 
least 1% but no more than 150% as suggested by Furfine & Rosen (2011). This criterion 
eliminates a substantial amount of deals, leaving only 887 deals in the sample. The confounding 
events will be bypassed by choosing deals with at least 180 trading days between two separate 
deal announcements by the same banking firm and not more than one deal pending until 180 
days following completion of a deal by the same bank (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). The 
sample is left with 766 deals after this category. Minimum size requirement of the deal is $10 
million because minor deals are not expected to impact acquirers' default risk, thereby only 24 
deals are omitted in this category. Finally, the sample consists of 608 deal observations after 
excluding deals for which data on share prices is only available less than the estimation period 
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(six months before merger announcement and six months after deal completion) or deals which 
data on share prices is only available in an infrequent basis and illiquid. The resulting dataset 
is described in Table 1 as follow. 
Table 1: Overview of M&A sample 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the M&A sample by year. As can be, the total deal value has 
decreased sharply over the sample period, from US$ 161,104 million in 1998 to about US$ 
20,446 million in 2015, except for a peak between 2006 and 2008. Additionally, the majority 
of sample mergers was announced between 1998 and 2006. This figure continues to fall sharply 
to only 13 deals in 2009 and 2011; this could be explained by the effects of the post-global 
financial crisis. It is worth noting that there are only a few deals where acquirers engage in 
acquisitions with public-listed targets in the sample. It is because private firms experience 
increasing pressures to merge due to the decrease in government ownership or the phasing out 
of public guarantees of their liabilities. 




Year Number	of	mergers % Total	deal	value	(million	US$) % Average	deal	value	(million	US$)
1998 48 7.89 161104.86 14.50 3356.35
1999 43 7.07 84977.83 7.65 1976.23
2000 49 8.06 140399.1 12.64 2865.29
2001 44 7.24 49579.35 4.46 1126.80
2002 26 4.28 38792.47 3.49 1492.02
2003 42 6.91 68607 6.17 1633.50
2004 50 8.22 70097.91 6.31 1401.96
2005 44 7.24 88520.18 7.97 2011.82
2006 42 6.91 119508.57 10.76 2845.44
2007 37 6.09 95405.37 8.59 2578.52
2008 20 3.29 101698.78 9.15 5084.94
2009 13 2.14 5243.91 0.47 403.38
2010 14 2.30 23252.54 2.09 1660.90
2011 13 2.14 7162.99 0.64 551.00
2012 18 2.96 8948.96 0.81 497.16
2013 27 4.44 9781.25 0.88 362.27
2014 46 7.57 17620.88 1.59 383.06
2015 32 5.26 20446.26 1.84 638.95
Total 608 100.00 1111148.21 100.00
Panel	A:	Mergers	and	acquisitions	distribution	by	year
Acquirer Target




Europe 2 53 6
North	America	 1 2 1 459
Oceania 9




 Table 2 breaks down the final sample of bank mergers according to the region of acquirers. 
The final sample consists of mergers with bidding banks predominantly located in the United 
States and the European Union, Norway and Switzerland. Moreover, it is analysed the risk 
effects of transactions in Asia (Japan, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand) and South America (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru). There occurred 463 mergers 
in North America and 65 in entire Europe. In Asia, 53 transactions were completed, while the 
remaining deals were completed in other regions (South America, Central America, Oceania 
and Africa). Thus, in 558 of 608 cases (91.77%), the acquiring bank's and the target's domicile 
are in the same country. For 591 transactions (97.2%) both the bidding bank and the target 
originate in the same region. 
Table 3: Merger sample by different categories 
 
Table 3 demonstrates the final sample divided based on different categories such as 
target status, payment method, the geography of the deal and product diversification. 
Regarding target status, private targets account for the most prominent number in all cases 
including US sample and non-US sample. For the payment method, deals financed by cash 
only in non-US sample constitute up to 45% out of 157 deals in total whereas it is only 19% of 
US sample. For the geographical region of the deals, it is observed that US acquirers tend to 
engage in domestic mergers (99%) meanwhile non-US acquirers are interested in cross-border 
deals more than US acquirers (29%). Regarding product diversification, both US and non-US 
acquirers show more interest in focusing deals than activity diversifying deals although the 
balance is more on the non-US acquirers' side. 
The definitions of the variables used in the cross-sectional analyses are given in 
Appendix C. Summary statistics for the independent variables are presented in table 4 below. 
Table 4: Variables descriptive statistics 
Private Listed Cash	only Cash	and	stock,	stock Cross-border Domestic Focusing	 Activity	diversifying
Full	sample	(608	deals) 598 10 157 451 50 558 543 65
US	sample	(451	deals) 450 1 86 365 4 447 423 28
Non-US	sample	(157	deals) 148 9 71 86 46 111 120 37
Target	status Payment	method Deal	geography Product	diversification
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3.2 Deal characteristics 
In this section, we address the concern of how merger-related changes in acquirers' 
contribution to systemic risk can be explained in the cross-section by a group of bidders and 
deal characteristics as well as variables on the acquiring banks' macroeconomic environment. 
First, deal characteristics used in the cross-sectional analysis as control variables consist of 
deal size, relative size, payment method, the status of target, geographic and product 
diversification are controlled for. Regarding the deal size and relative size, both variables' signs 
are expected to be unrestricted. On the one hand, large deals may produce a risk-reducing effect 
on acquirers' contribution to systemic risk as larger banks can be able to diversify their credit 
and asset portfolios better. Nevertheless, larger deals are positively connected with 
organisational and procedural complexity integrating with the target, hence reduce 
transparency (Beck et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2012; Laeven et al., 2016). The deal payment 
method is represented by a dummy variable which equals one if the merger is financed in cash 
only and zero otherwise. This dummy is motivated by hypothesis three of this chapter which 
predicts that deals financed by cash only will have a risk-increasing effect on systemic risk. 
Furthermore, target status is controlled via a dummy variable which differentiates between 
private (1) or public-listed (0) target institutions. Merger deals involved in private targets are 
expected to generate risk-increasing effect for acquirers because private firms are subject to 
Table	1
Mean Std.	dev. Min Median Max
Risk	Measures MES:	before	merger	(-180	days,	-11	days) 0.005 0.010 -0.014 0.003 0.036
MES:	after	merger	(+11	days,	+180	days) 0.005 0.011 -0.015 0.003 0.042
Change	in	Marginal	Expected	Shortfall 0.000 0.011 -0.028 0.000 0.032
∆CoVaR:	before	merger	(-180	days,	-11	days) 0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.018
∆CoVaR:	after	merger	(+11	days,	+180	days) 0.002 0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.017
Change	in	∆CoVaR 0.000 0.004 -0.015 0.000 0.013
Deal	characteristics Payment	method 0.258 0.438 0.000 0.000 1.000
Status	of	target 0.987 0.114 0.000 1.000 1.000
Log	of	deal	size	(in	million	US	dollar) 5.299 1.932 2.486 4.868 10.331
Relative	size 0.426 0.772 0.032 0.237 1.000
Cross	border 0.082 0.274 0.000 0.000 1.000
Product	diversification 0.106 0.309 0.000 0.000 1.000
ROA	(%) 1.223 0.627 0.007 1.152 3.544
Market	to	book	ratio	(%) 1.610 0.730 0.476 1.441 4.021
Leverage	(%) 7.240 7.619 0.000 5.404 66.187
Operating	efficiency	(%) 2.829 0.980 0.706 2.783 6.425
Capital	ratio	(%) 9.201 3.057 2.382 9.027 20.838
Total	assets	(in	million	US	dollar) 8.742 1.852 5.942 8.303 13.459
Too	big	to	fail	motive 0.250 0.433 0.000 0.000 1.000
Country	control GDP	(%) 3.122 1.874 -2.780 2.810 8.899
HHI	index 0.083 0.074 0.050 0.070 0.540
Political	stability	(from	-2.5	to	2.5) 0.467 0.548 -1.600 0.575 1.425







lower disclosure requirements; thus, it limits the acquirers’ capabilities to evaluate the risks 
associated with private targets themselves as well as making bidders’ due diligence ineffective 
(Furfine and Rosen, 2011).  
Apart from that, two more dummy variables are adding to the regressions to capture the 
geographic nature and product-diversifying nature of merger: geographic diversification 
(cross-border deals versus domestic deals) or product diversification (diversifying versus 
focusing deals). Dummy product diversification is stimulated by the second hypothesis of this 
chapter, predicting that product-diversifying deals generate more risk-reducing effect than 
focusing deals. It is because diversification can bring about benefits through co-insurance 
(Asquith and Kim, 1982), expansion and development, efficiency achievement through scale 
and scope economies and improved profit; thereby lower firm’s default risk (Halpern, 1983) 
and maintain the stability of the financial system.  
3.3. Acquirer characteristics 
The second group we use is pre-merger bidding banks' characteristics. We utilise the 
return on assets (ROA) of acquirers as proxy for the their level of profitability; acquirers' total 
assets (log value) to proxy for bank's size; the market-to-book-ratio to monitor for the hubris 
of acquiring banks' management (see Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011) and capital ratio to 
monitor for acquirers' leverage. The profitability performance proxy (ROA) is expected to have 
a systemic risk-reducing effect for acquirers. Moreover, the projected sign of the coefficient 
for the market-to-book ratio is unknown. Vallascas & Hagendorff (2011) suggest negative 
effects of market-to-book ratio to the bidding banks’ risk. On the other hand, Keeley (1990) 
asserts that more valuable banking institutions have fewer motivations to take part in risky 
transactions because valuable charters cannot be traded if they go bankrupt. For acquirers' 
leverage, it is expected that variables leverage's signs and capital ratio's signs (an additional 
proxy for leverage) are unrestricted. On the one hand, leverage increases liquidation risk (with 
the outlook of pay losses for executives) and puts pressures on the executive to produce high, 
and sufficiency cash flows for interest payments. Thus, executives at banking firms with low 
leverage might be more interested in engaging in risky transactions such as M&As with their 
free cash flows which raise their pay level and the possibility of organisational failures 
(Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). On the other hand, banking firms with a low level of 
leverage can simply be overcapitalised in comparison to their target's capital ratio. Therefore, 
acquiring bank can be motivated to acquire a target with a high level of leverage instead of, 
e.g. issuing new debt. In case of acquiring bank simply altering its capital structure, the rise in 
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leverage should not be associated with any substantial changes in acquiring bank’s total risk 
(Weiß et al., 2014). The operating efficiency ratio is added to the regressions to assess the 
influence of management quality on the merger-related changes in bidders' contribution to 
systemic risk. Indeed, a more efficient operation is expected to reduce systemic risk (or have a 
positive relationship with the change in distance to default). Regarding acquirer's total assets, 
the influence of bidding bank's pre-merger size on systemic risk measures is hypothesised to 
be positive. It is because smaller banks tend to be motivated to engage in M&As and become 
too-big-to-fail which, in turn, increase bidders' contribution to systemic risk (see Benston et 
al., 1995). 
Motives for banks M&As were different before and during the crisis, and the 
occurrence of the 2007-09 global financial crisis raises the need to consider a major motive for 
M&A which is called “too-big-to-fail motive”. During the global financial crisis, banking firms 
can be stimulated to engage in M&A transactions to become SIFIs to exploit the safety net, 
government bailouts or to establish a more solid institution (see Molyneux et al., (2014)). 
Therefore, too-big-to-fail variable is included in the regressions to test if the findings are driven 
by banks with the motivation to merge to become too-big-to-fail (i.e., banks that were near 
default and had the lowest possibilities of obtaining a bailout before the merger). To construct 
the variable, first, the pre-merger default risk of acquirers in the sample utilising the Merton 
distance-to-default methodology as in Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) will be extracted from 
the previous empirical chapter. Following that, this dummy variable takes the value of 1 for 
banks in the first distance to default quartile (i.e. banks with the highest level of pre-merger 
default risk) and 0 otherwise.   
3.4 Macroeconomic control variables 
The third set of control variables we use consists of a relevant macroeconomic 
environment of acquirers because they may influence the relation between bank mergers and 
systemic risk. To be precise, the annual real GDP growth rate as a percentage, an indicator of 
political stability, an indicator for the rule of law and the HHI (market concentration index) of 
the bidding bank's home country are included. Higher concentration implies fewer effective 
bidders, which enhance the pricing power of the acquirer (James and Wier, 1987). Likewise, a 
country with the stable political environment may promote safer markets for a bank to operate. 
All the macroeconomic control variables are retrieved from the World Bank's World 
Development Indicator (WDI) database. 
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4. Methodology 
The purpose of this section is to briefly demonstrate the methodology used for measuring the 
systemic risk effects of bank mergers. More specifically, two reliable and strong approaches: 
Marginal Expected Shortfall as in Brownlees and Engle (2012) and CoVaR as in Girardi and 
Tolga Ergün (2013) are employed to assess the acquiring banks’ contribution to systemic risk.  
4.1 Marginal expected shortfall 
In our empirical analysis, we measure the merger-related change in the contribution of 
an individual bank to systemic risk by the use of the bank’s marginal expected shortfall as in 
Brownlees and Engle (2012). Let us consider a financial system composed of n institutions. 
The financial system's global return (market return after that) is defined as the value-weighted 
average of all firm returns 
𝑟𝑚𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1  (1) 
𝑟𝑚𝑡 denotes the aggregate return of the financial system on day t 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the corresponding return of firm i. 
𝑤𝑖𝑡is the weight of the ith firm in the financial system at time t 
These weights are given by the relative market capitalisation of the financial 
institutions. Let us assume that the aggregate risk of the financial system is measured by the 
conditional Expected Shortfall (ES). By actuarial convention, the ES is the expected market 
loss conditional on the return being less than the 𝛼 quantile, i.e. the VaR. It can also be extended 
to a more general case, where the distress event is defined by a threshold C. The conditional 
ES (for past information) at time t is formally given by 
𝐸𝑆𝑚𝑡(𝐶) = −𝔼𝑡−1(𝑟𝑚𝑡|𝑟𝑚𝑡 < 𝐶) (2) 
threshold C is the distress event 
Acharya et al., (2017) proposed the concept of MES. This systemic risk measure 
corresponds to the marginal contribution of a firm to the risk of the financial system measured 
by ES. It corresponds to the change in the market’s ES engendered by a unit increase in the 
weight of the ith institution in the financial system (see Appendix A.1 for the derivation of this 
expression) 
𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡(𝐶) =  
𝜕𝐸𝑆𝑚𝑡(𝐶)
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑡
= 𝔼𝑡−1(𝑟𝑖𝑡|𝑟𝑚𝑡 < 𝐶) (3) 
Let us consider a bivariate GARCH model for the demeaned return processes, which 
corresponds to a simple market model (CAPM) with time-varying conditional betas 






′ = (𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡) denotes the vector of market and firm returns and where the random vector 
𝑣𝑡
′ = (𝜀𝑚𝑡𝜉𝑖𝑡 ) is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) shocks and has the following 
first movements: 𝔼(𝑣𝑡) = 0 and 𝔼(𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑡
′) = 𝐼2, a two-by-two identity matrix. The 𝐻𝑡 matrix 





2 ) (5) 
where 𝜎𝑖𝑡 and 𝜎𝑚𝑡 denote the conditional standard deviations for the firm and the system, 𝜌𝑖𝑡 
the time-varying conditional correlation. No particular assumptions are made about the 
bivariate distribution of the standardised innovations 𝑣𝑡, which is assumed to be unknown. We 
only assume that the time-varying conditional correlations 𝜌𝑖𝑡 fully captures the dependence 
between firm and market returns. Formally, this assumption implies that the standardised 
innovations 𝜀𝑚𝑡 and 𝜉𝑖𝑡 are independently distributed at time t.  
Given Equations (4) and (5), the MES can be expressed as a function of the firm's return 
volatility, its correlation with the market return, and the comovement of the tail of the 
distribution (See Appendix A.2 for the derivation of this expression): 
𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡(𝐶) =  𝜎𝑖𝑡𝜌𝑖𝑡𝔼𝑡−1 (𝜀𝑚𝑡|𝜀𝑚𝑡 <
𝐶
𝜎𝑚𝑡
) +  𝜎𝑖𝑡√1 − 𝜌𝑖𝑡




Therefore, MES is a non-linear combination of four elements: volatility, correlation, 
tails expectations and the weight of the firm. 
To compute the MES for each financial institution, we implement the estimation 
method of Brownlees and Engle (2012) and the models defined in Equations (4) and (5) will 
be used. The steps followed in developing the model are listed below. 
Step 1: We model the time-varying correlations of each couple ‘market-firm’ using a 
dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model (Engle, 2001). From this, conditional volatilities 
and standardised residuals for the market and each institution are obtained by modelling 
volatilities in a GJR- GARCH(1,1) framework (Glosten et al., 1993). We estimate the 
parameters by Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML), since it provides consistent and 
asymptotically normal estimators under mild regularity conditions, without making any 
distributional assumptions about the innovations process. 
Step 2: Relying on the i.i.d. Property of the innovations, we next proceed to a non-







) along the lines of (Scaillet, 2005): 
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where 𝑘 = 𝐶 𝜎𝑚𝑡⁄  is the threshold, ∅(. ) represents the normal c.d.f. (Gaussian Kernel 
function), and h is the bandwidth. In the empirical application, we set C to VaR-HS(5%) of the 
system and h to 𝑇
−1
5⁄  as in Scaillet (2005). For a formal proof, see Appendix A.3.  
Step 3. We apply the volatilities and correlations obtained in step 1 and tail expectations 
gained from step 2 back to equation (6) to calculate the Marginal Expected Shortfall of 
institution i at each date t. 
Later, we run a test to check whether the differences between the banks' post- and pre-
merger marginal expected short falls are, on average, different from zero. A day t is defined to 
belong to the pre-merger period if it falls into the interval [–180; -11] relative to the merger 
announcement. Similarly, a day t is considered to belong to the post-merger period if it falls 
into the interval [+11; +180] relative to the merger completion. To test the hypothesis that the 
mean of the changes in the acquirers' MES post-merger is different from zero, we employ a 




5%  (9) 
The first advantage of this method is that MES is an explicit economic model where 
systemic risk measurement relies on observable market data and statistical techniques; 
therefore, it is simple to calculate and easy for banking supervisors to implement. Second, MES 
and leverage are a good predictor of a firm’s contribution to a systemic crisis unlike other 
standard measures of firm-level risks, such as VaR or volatility with no explanatory power or 
beta with modest explanatory power. Third, being model-based enhance the logical consistency 
of the measurement of MES and SES. Finally, this measure scales naturally with the size of 
the firm and is additive concerning mergers and spinoffs. These properties do not hold in many 
of the reduced form approaches. However, as noted by Acharya et al. (2010), the definition 
and estimation of the MES do not capture the true tails of the return distribution as it is 
computed from the moderately bad days of the market and not the worst performance of the 
market during a true financial crisis. Moreover, the data for this method is based on share 
returns only and exclude reference to a bank's size or its capital capacity which are considered 
as important elements of systemic risk (Kupiec and Guntay, 2016). 
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4.2 Conditional Value at Risk 
In addition to MES, we follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) to measure systemic 
risk via the conditional value- at-risk (CoVaR) of the financial system, conditional on 
institutions being in a state of distress. A firm’s contribution to systemic risk is defined as the 
difference between the CoVaR of the firm being in distress and the CoVaR in the median state 
of the firm. This measure is based on the concept of Value-at-Risk, denoted VaR(), which is 
the maximum loss within the %-confidence interval (see Jorion, 2007). Then, the CoVaR 
corresponds to the VaR of the market return obtained conditionally on some event ℂ (𝑟𝑖𝑡) 
observed for firm i. 
𝑃𝑟 (𝑟𝑚𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑚|ℂ (𝑟𝑖𝑡)|ℂ (𝑟𝑖𝑡)) =  (10) 
𝑟𝑚𝑡 denotes the aggregate return of the financial system on day t 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the corresponding return of firm i. 
 is the confidence interval (%) 
threshold ℂ is the distress event 
The CoVaR of firm i is then defined as the difference between the VaR of the financial 
system conditional on this particular firm being in financial distress and the VaR of the 
financial system conditional on firm i being in its median state. To define the distress of a 
financial institution (a condition when a bank could not meet or has difficult to pay back its 
financial obligations to its creditors, normally because of illiquid assets or high fixed costs), 
we consider various definitions of ℂ (𝑟𝑖𝑡). 
A more general approach would consist in defining the financial distress of firm i as a situation 




In this theoretical framework, it is also possible to express CoVaR, defined for a 
conditioning event ℂ (𝑟𝑖𝑡): 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡(), as a function of the conditional correlations, 
volatilities, and VaR. Given Equations (4) and (5), the following result is obtained (see 
Appendix B.1 for the derivation of this expression): 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() =𝛾𝑖𝑡[𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() - 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡(0.5)] (12) 
where 𝛾𝑖𝑡= 𝜎𝑚𝑡𝜌𝑖𝑡/𝜎𝑖𝑡. If the marginal distribution of the returns is symmetric around zero, 
CoVaR is strictly proportional to VaR: 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() =𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() (13) 
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Then we perform the GARCH estimation of CoVaR based on the following three steps 
procedure: 
Step 1: First, we compute VaR of each institution i by estimating the following 
univariate model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (14), 
where 
𝑖𝑡
= 0 + 1𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡𝜎𝑖𝑡 where 𝑖𝑡 is independently and identically 
distributed (i.i.d) with zero mean and unit variance and the conditional variance has the 








Given a distributional assumption for  and, hence, the q-quantile of the estimated 
conditional distribution, for each time period, we calculate the VaR of each institution i  
Step 2: for each institution i, a bivariate GARCH model is estimated with Engle’s 
(2002) DCC specification for the returns of institution i and the financial system. Let 𝑟𝑡 =
(𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡)
′ whose joint dynamics is given by 






 is the (2 x 2) conditional covariance matrix of the error term 𝜀𝑡 and 𝑡 is the (2 x 
1) vector of conditional means. The standardized innovation vector 𝑣𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡
−
1
2(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑡) is 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) with 𝐸(𝑣𝑡) = 0 and 𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝑣𝑡) = 𝐼2 
 𝐷𝑡is defined to be the (2 x 2) diagonal matrix with the conditional variances 𝜎𝑥𝑡
2  and 
𝜎𝑦𝑡
2  along the diagonal so that {𝐷𝑥𝑥}𝑡 = {𝐻𝑥𝑥}𝑡 , {𝐷𝑦𝑦}𝑡 = {𝐻𝑦𝑦}𝑡 and {𝐷𝑥𝑦}𝑡 = 0 for x,y=m,i. 





















and the conditional covariance 𝜎𝑥𝑦,𝑡 is  
𝜎𝑥𝑦,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑥𝑦,𝑡√𝜎 𝑥𝑡
2 𝜎 𝑦𝑡
2   (20) 




= {𝜌𝑥𝑦}𝑡  be the (2 x 2) matrix of conditional correlations of 𝜀𝑡. 
Following Engle (2001) the conditional correlation matrix will be as follows 
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡)
−1/2 ∗ 𝑄𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡)
−1/2(21) 
𝑄𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿1 − 𝛿2)?̅? + 𝛿1(𝑡−1𝑡−1
′ ) + 𝛿2𝑄𝑡−1 (22) 
 20 
where ?̅? is the unconditional covariance matrix of 𝑡 = {𝜀𝑥𝑡/𝜎𝑥𝑡}𝑥=𝑚,𝑖 and 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡) is the (2 
x 2) matrix with the diagonal of  𝑄𝑡on the diagonal and zeros off-diagonal. 
Step 3: Once the bivariate density 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑡(𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡)
′ pair is estimated in step 2, in step 3, 
we obtain 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() to measure for each financial institution i and period t in equation (12). 
Similar to marginal expected shortfall, a test is run to check whether the differences 
between the banks’ post- and pre-merger CoVaR are, on average, different from zero. To test 
the hypothesis that the mean of the changes in the acquirers’ CoVaR post-merger are different 




5%  (23) 
There are several advantages associated with CoVaR as a measure. First, while 
CoVaR emphasises on the contribution of each firm to overall system risk, conventional risk 
measures rely on the risk of individual firms. Banking regulations and policies based on the 
risk of firms in segregation may result in excessive risk-taking along systemic risk 
measurements. Another benefit of this co-risk measure is that it is general enough to study the 
risk spillovers from banks to banks throughout the entire financial system. Furthermore, the 
authors establish that the "forward- CoVaRs" have out-of-sample predictive power for 
realised correlation in tail events. The forward- CoVaR can be utilised to oversee the build-
up of systemic risk in a forward-looking mode. This forward-looking measure can potentially 
be used in macro-prudential policy applications. Finally, it reduces the effect of the arbitrary 
selection of a single level of confidence on expected losses (Sum, 2016).  
5. Results 
In this section, we discuss the results of our analysis of merger-related changes in acquirers’ 
contribution to systemic risk. Our objective is to answer the question whether bank mergers in 
general lead to a lower contribution of the acquirer to systemic risk. Moreover, we recognise 
the factors driving these changes in systemic risk. 
5.1 Systemic risk effects 
Table 5 below reports the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and CoVaR of 
acquiring banks before and after mergers based on the global sample of 608 banks M&As.  
Table 5: Merger-related changes in MES and CoVaR 
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 For acquirers' MES, the results show that before M&A, European, U.S. and bidding banks 
from other countries (excluding Asia) pose greater contribution to systemic risk than their 
Asian peers. The MES of European, US and other countries' bidders are 0.0065, 0.0052, 0.007 
respectively compared to 0.0026 of Asia bidders. Noticeably, acquiring banks' MES post-
merger show the same consensus. The reasons for this observation may be because, for 
European acquirers, empirical evidence tend to suggest that cross-border bank mergers within 
the EU may involve regulatory arbitrage. Banking firms in the EU can relocate their activities 
geographically, thereby shifting their poorly controlled risk to the taxpayers in other nations 
which can destabilise the entire banking system (see Hagendorff et al., 2012; Molyneux et al., 
2014). For US acquirers, Rao-nicholson and Salaber (2016) detect an increase in bank 
concentration in the US where the consequences of the 2007-09 global financial crisis are 
severe. As discussed in section 6.2.2.3, a highly concentrated banking market with few 
tremendous players may contribute to a less stability in the banking system which is consistent 
with the concentration fragility hypothesis.   
To analyse whether mergers impact the contribution to systemic risk of acquirers, the 
merger-related change in MES is tested to check if it is equal to zero. The findings of the full-
sample analysis show that the change in the bidding banks’ MES is 0.0001 and it is not 
statistically significant. At the regional level, it is seen that the increase in the bidding banks’ 
MES is strongest for the mergers in the U.S. and Asia; nevertheless, the change in MES of U.S. 
and Asian acquirers are not statistically significant either. In short, these first results show that 
mergers do not produce a statistically significant reduction in the acquiring banks’ contribution 
N
MES	Pre-merger MES	Post-merger Change	in	MES ∆CoVaR	Pre-merger ∆CoVaR	Post-merger Change	in	∆CoVaR
U.S. 451 0.0052	*** 0.00547	*** 0.00023 0.0022	*** 0.0024	*** 0.0002
0 0 0.6209 0.0000 0.0000 0.2056
Europe 65 0.0065	*** 0.0058	*** -0.0009 0.004	*** 0.0031	*** -0.0010
0.0000 0.0000 0.6010 0.0000 0.0000 0.1259
Asia 53 0.0026	** 0.0042	*** 0.0017 0.0012	*** 0.00117	*** 0.0000
0.0396 0.0001 0.3107 0.0000 0.0001 0.9393
Others 39 0.007	*** 0.0051	*** -0.0018 0.0034	*** 0.0023	*** -0.0010*
0.0000 0.0058 0.1693 0.0001 0.0056 0.0634
Total 608 0.0052	*** 0.0053	*** 0.0001 0.0024	*** 0.00239	*** 0.0000










to systemic risk. This finding contradicts with Weiß et al. (2014) as they found a significant 
increase in merging banks' contribution to systemic risk following mergers. The possible 
reason why their findings are not as optimistic as this finding is that their sample excludes 
mergers that involve insurance companies, loan or security bankers. Such sample may not offer 
considerable diversification benefits as well as risk-reducing effects deriving from product 
diversification. Moreover, this sample period extends beyond the 2007-09 global financial 
crisis; banks may no longer merge to become too-big-to-fail and engage in excessive risk-
taking. Instead, they may pursue M&A for healthy growth, expansion of business lines and 
locations or acquisitions of new customer bases; thereby increase business profit and enhance 
the stability of the banking system. Therefore, the result from this sample is at best risk neutral. 
Regarding the CoVaR of acquirers, it recorded that the pre-merger level of the 
CoVaR is higher for the banks in Europe, the U.S. and other nations (excluding Asia) than 
acquiring banks in Asia and it is statistically significant at 1% level for the full sample. 
However, similar to MES of acquirers, the change in CoVaR for the full sample is not 
statistically significant. It can be concluded that M&A does not modify the contribution of 
acquiring banks to systemic risk. Therefore, the first hypothesis that bank mergers coincide 
with a significant reduction in the bidding bank's contribution to systemic risk is rejected.   
For a more precise analysis, the sample is divided into nine sub-samples including deal 
value, different market types, geographic diversification, product diversification, relative size, 
payment method, total assets, ROA, acquirers' risk profile before the merger and analyse the 
changes in the bidding banks' contribution to systemic risk. Table 6 reports the investigation 
of the sub-samples based on (A) deal characteristics, (B) acquirer characteristics. 
Table 6: Sub-sample analysis 
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Panel A of table 6 shows deal characteristics, differentiating between high, medium, 
and low deal values. The results of the computations show that all the change in MES and 
CoVaR for the bidding banks are statistically insignificant for all of the sub-samples based 
on the deal size. This finding is interestingly contradicting Mühlnickel and Weiß (2015) as they 
find that the larger the size of the merger, the more massive the incremental increase in the 
insurance acquirers' contribution to the probability of a crash of the insurance industry will be. 
The different results may be because the authors measure extreme systemic risk by using lower 
tail dependence methodology as opposed to MES which measures the marginal contribution to 
systemic risk. Further, the nature of the acquirers' markets is considered, differentiating 
between developing market, developed market and frontier market. Bank M&As still do not 
produce any risk-reducing or risk-increasing effects for systemic risk.   
N Change	in	MES Change	in	∆CoVaR N Change	in	MES Change	in	∆CoVaR
Panel	A:	Deal	Characteristics
Deal	value Markets
High	deal	value 203 -0.00034 -0.00033 Emerging	markets 55 0.0016 -0.00083
0.6691 0.2943 0.2801 0.1424
Medium	deal	value 203 0.00015 0 Developed	markets 539 -0.0001 0
0.8155 0.704 0.8183 0.6495
Low	deal	value 202 0.00053 0.00019 Frontier	markets 14 0.0024 -0.00034
0.467 0.4484 0.4988 0.7627
Geographic	diversification Product	diversification
Cross-border	merger 50 0.00064 0.000184 Activity-diversifying	merger 58 -0.001 -0.00042
0.6236 0.6909 0.4586 0.442
Domestic	merger 558 0 0 Focusing	merger 543 0.00025 0
0.8798 0.849 0.5777 0.8405
Relative	size
Low	relative	size 202 0.0013	* 0.000755	*** Payment	method
0.0575 0.0054 Cash	only 157 0.0016	** 0.0004
Medium	relative	size 203 -0.0002 -0.000478 0.0445 0.1808
0.7879 0.107 Others 451 -0.0004 -0.0001




High	total	assets 203 -0.00016 -0.00032 High	ROA 203 0.00049 0
0.837 0.3137 0.4569 0.7345
Medium	total	assets 203 0.001 0.00033 Medium	ROA 203 0 0
0.1607 0.2331 0.9957 0.7461
Low	total	assets 202 -0.00039 0 Low	ROA 202 -0.00015 0.000125
0.5597 0.9068 0.8617 0.7018
Acquirers	risk	profile	before	merger
High	risk	profile	before	merger 203 -0.0011 -0.00049
0.2331 0.1482
Medium	risk	profile	before	merger 203 0.0007 0.000133
0.2477 0.6092








In the next two specifications, the cross-border mergers and domestic deals, as well as 
focusing deals and product diversifying deals, are distinguished from one another. The results 
offer evidence that neither the two forms of geographic and product diversification influence 
acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. This finding is quite similar with Vallascas and 
Hagendorff (2011) in the sense that they find European bank consolidations do not affect 
acquiring banks' change in default risk regardless of the high potential for risk reduction 
displayed by product-diversifying or cross-border deals. This result raises doubt on the 
capability of bank consolidation, in general, to make use of a risk-decreasing and stabilising 
effect on the banking sector.   
Moving onto the next specification, we employ the relative deal value and differentiate 
between high, medium, and low relative size. The results show that for deals where the target 
size is small compared to acquirers' market value, there is an increase in the MES and CoVaR 
(statistically and economically significant at 10% level for MES and 1% level for CoVaR); 
therefore, the contribution to systemic risk of acquiring banks increase. To justify this finding, 
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) show in their theoretical setup that when many banks default, 
it is optimal for the regulator to bail out some or all banks in distress. However, when the 
number of failed banks is small, the failed banks will exit the market via the acquisition 
channel, making them the target of other predators. As a consequence, small banks are 
motivated to engage in M&A with larger banks to gain an implicit bailout guarantee which in 
turn increases overall systemic risk.  
The last specification in panel A is distinguishing between mergers financed by cash 
only and mergers financed by other methods (shares only, shares and cash). There is an increase 
in the MES for cash-only deals (statistically and economically significant at 5%); thereby such 
deals contribute to the increase in acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk. Indeed, Furfine & 
Rosen (2011) propose that deals which are fully paid for in cash are expected to raise acquiring 
banks' default risk as acquirers are replacing safe liquid assets (cash) with a riskier balance 
sheet of the target; thereby may also lead to the increase in acquirers' contribution to systemic 
risk. 
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results attained using acquirer characteristics. The first 
two specifications based on the bidding banks’ total assets and ROA as a proxy for the level of 
profitability performance, all of the change in the MES and CoVaR is statistically 
insignificant. It indicates that mergers do not alter the level of acquirers' contribution to 
systemic risk regardless of their size or pre-merger profitability performance. The last 
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specification in this panel divides the pre-merger default risk profile of acquirers into high risk, 
medium risk and low-risk bidders. No statistically significant change in MES and CoVaR is 
observed for this category for all sub-samples based on acquirers’ risk profile.  
Overall, results from the univariate test reveal that mergers and acquisitions, on 
average, do not influence the acquiring banks’ contribution to systemic risk regardless of the 
increased potential for risk diversification exhibited by cross-border and cross-industry bank 
mergers. However, for a group of deals that target size is relatively small compared to 
acquirers’ market value and deals that financed by cash-only, mergers increase acquirers’ 
contribution to systemic risk.  
5.2 Determinants of merger-related systemic risk effects 
In this section, we examine if certain types of deal and acquirer characteristics or the 
acquirers’ macroeconomic environment influence acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk. We 
estimate the regressions via OLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent Huber–White standard 
errors. The results of the multiple regressions of systemic risk effects around bank mergers 
focus on the determinants of merger-related changes on acquirers’ MES presented in table 7 
and acquirers’ CoVaR in table 8 below.  
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(1)	All	banks	 (2)	All	banks	 (3)	US	banks	 (4)	Non-US	
banks	
Acquirers	and	deal	characteristics
Payment	method 0.0024 ** 0.0027 ** 0.0015 0.0053 ***
0.0195 0.0121 0.2178 0.0068
Status	of	target 0.0032 0.0026 0.0012 0.0048
0.1974 0.1540 0.3681 0.1960
Deal	size 0.0715 0.1170 0.2000 1.2870
0.9049 0.8442 0.5320 0.4055
Relative	size -0.0014 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0029 ** -0.0014 **
0.0023 0.0050 0.0314 0.0232
Cross-border	 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005
0.7231 0.9305 0.9696 0.8557
Product	diversification	 -0.0017 -0.0019 0.0018 -0.0042 *
0.2403 0.1984 0.3459 0.0630
ROA -0.0238 -0.0001 -0.0100 0.0428
0.7905 0.9986 0.9061 0.7349
Market	to	book	ratio 0.0596 0.0797 0.0009 0.1568
0.5175 0.3367 0.9919 0.4921
Leverage -0.0063 -0.0044 -0.0064 -0.0005
0.3162 0.4929 0.5627 0.9507
Operating	efficiency -0.0577 -0.0247 -0.0500 -0.0986
0.3085 0.6427 0.4954 0.2717
Capital	ratio -0.0037 -0.0010 -0.0002 -0.0334
0.8295 0.9517 0.9930 0.2958
Acquirers	total	assets -0.0099 -0.0699 0.1000 -1.1680
0.9882 0.9172 0.6920 0.4818
Too	big	to	fail	motive 0.0015 0.0013 0.0018 * 0.0035










R-squared 0.0436 0.0287 0.0261 0.1751
Adj.	R-squared 0.0159 0.0073 -0.0029 0.0735
Number	of	observations 608 608 451 157
**,	*	Denotes	significance	at	5%	and	10%
***	Denotes	significance	at	1%
Determinants of the changes in MES: deal characteristics, acquirer characteristics and acquirers' macroeconomic
environment. The dependent variable is the change in MES. The model is estimated via OLS with heteroskedasticity-
consistentHuber–Whitestandarderrors.Model (1) usesall acquirers,model(2)usesthe same acquirers but without country
controls, model (3) uses US acquirers and model (4) uses non-US acquirers. All variables and data sources are defined in
chapter	4.	Statistically	significant	coefficients	are	highlighted	in	bold	type.	The	P-values	are	denoted	in	parentheses.
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Table 8: Determinants of the changes in CoVaR 
 
Regression (1) of table 7 estimates the relationship between the changes in the 
acquirers' MES using acquirer and deal characteristics as well as acquirers' macroeconomic 
environment for the full sample of mergers. The payment method variable in the regression has 
(1)	All	banks	 (2)	All	banks	 (3)	US	banks	 (4)	Non-US	
banks	
Acquirers	and	deal	characteristics
Payment	method 0.0007 * 0.0006 * 0.0001 0.0024 ***
0.0861 0.0978 0.7557 0.0019
Status	of	target 0.0022 ** 0.0022 *** 0.0003 0.0022
0.0251 0.0082 0.4651 0.1003
Deal	size -0.0736 -0.1000 0.0728 0.4540
0.7364 0.5679 0.5832 0.3927
Relative	size -0.0004 ** -0.0004 ** -0.0008 * -0.0005 **
0.0241 0.0241 0.0857 0.0374
Cross-border	 0.0008 0.0004 0.0017 0.0004
0.2069 0.4714 0.1562 0.6481
Product	diversification	 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0012
0.3186 0.2187 0.6807 0.1270
ROA -0.0145 -0.0200 -0.0100 0.0004
0.6564 0.4149 0.6898 0.9940
Market	to	book	ratio 0.0010 0.0100 0.0090 -0.0430
0.9756 0.6604 0.7803 0.5675
Leverage -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0028 0.0023
0.5639 0.6225 0.5257 0.4803
Operating	efficiency -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0047 0.0012
0.9904 0.9898 0.8854 0.9714
Capital	ratio -0.0001 0.0005 0.0034 -0.0213
0.9908 0.9421 0.7322 0.1220
Acquirers	total	assets 0.0952 0.0940 0.1000 -0.4320
0.6913 0.6972 0.1279 0.4189
Too	big	to	fail	motive 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0013










R-squared 0.0343 0.0244 0.0194 0.1472
Adj.	R-squared 0.0063 0.0029 -0.0098 0.0421
Number	of	observations 608 608 451 157
**,	*	Denotes	significance	at	5%	and	10%
***	Denotes	significance	at	1%
Determinants of the changes in △ CoVaR : deal characteristics, acquirer characteristics and acquirers' macroeconomic
environment. The dependent variable is the change in △ CoVaR. The model is estimated via OLS with heteroskedasticity-
consistentHuber–Whitestandarderrors.Model (1) usesall acquirers,model(2)usesthe same acquirers but without country
controls, model (3) uses US acquirers and model (4) uses non-US acquirers. All variables and data sources are defined in
chapter	4.	Statistically	significant	coefficients	are	highlighted	in	bold	type.	The	P-values	are	denoted	in	parentheses.
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positive and statistically significant coefficient at 5% level. This finding is consistent with the 
univariate test in the previous section that mergers financed by cash only increase acquirers' 
contribution to systemic risk. It is also consistent with the hypothesis that when the safe liquid 
assets (cash) is replaced for the riskier balance sheet of targets, the bidders' default risk may 
increase which, in turns increase bidders' contribution to systemic risk (Furfine and Rosen, 
2011). Therefore, hypothesis 3 which predicts that cash-only mergers increase acquirers' 
contribution to systemic risk is confirmed. Also, relative size has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient (at 1% level). It indicates that the smaller the deal value compared to 
acquirers' market value, mergers will increase acquirers' contribution to systemic risk which is 
consistent with the univariate test in the last section. This effect may be explained as small 
banks are motivated to engage in M&A with larger banks to gain an implicit bailout guarantee 
from the government which in turn increases overall systemic risk (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 
2007). This result is somehow consistent with the findings in Weiß et al. (2014) as they detect 
the systemic risk increase regardless the relative size is small, medium or large. The bank 
concentration index HHI has a negative and statistically significant coefficient (at 10% level). 
It implies that for a more concentrated a banking system, the acquirers’ contribution to systemic 
risk will decrease which is an initial signal of the “concentration-stability hypothesis” as in 
Beck et al. (2006). Nevertheless, this evidence is not strong enough because the significance 
of the coefficient of this variable is at 10% only.  
A further check is conducted to study whether these results hold when switching to the 
acquirers’ CoVaR as a measure of systemic risk contribution. Regression (1) of table 8 
constitutes the baseline regression in which acquirer and deal characteristics, as well as the 
macroeconomic environment of acquirers, are used as independent variables. Similar to the 
results of the regressions based on MES changes, relative size again has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient. Payment method, on the other hand, witnesses weakly 
significant positive coefficients. Surprisingly, the status of target variable shows positive and 
statistically significant coefficient in this regression. It indicates that private target is a 
determinant of the increase in acquirers' contribution to systemic risk post-merger as 
hypothesised. Indeed, mergers involved in private targets are projected to produce a risk-
increasing effect for acquirers because private firms are subject to lower disclosure 
requirements; hence, it restricts the acquirers' capabilities to evaluate the risks associated with 
private targets themselves as well as making acquirers' due diligence ineffective. Therefore, 
the acquisitions of hidden risks from target firms may contribute to the increase in acquirers' 
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default risk as well as their contribution to systemic risk. Dissimilar to the regressions using 
acquirers' MES, political stability witnesses negative and statistically significant coefficient. It 
means that a macroeconomic environment with high political stability will help to decrease 
acquirers' contribution to systemic risk which is somehow consistent with what is found in 
Weiß et al., (2014).  
Moving onto regression (2) of table 7, the motivation for this specification is that 
acquirers and deals characteristics can solely drive the cross-sectional variation in the deal-
related changes in acquiring banks' MES. Therefore, excluding country controls might improve 
the overall fit of the model. Regression (2) continues to observe the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of payment method. Also, the relative size is the negative and 
statistically significant predictor of the merger-induced change in acquirer' MES which is 
similar to regression (1). However, the adjusted R-squared of regression (2) is smaller than 
regression (1), indicating that acquirers and deals characteristic variables alone possess less 
power for explaining the changes in MES than including also country controls. The R-squared 
of regression (2) compared to regression (1) of table 8 confirms the same observation. Results 
from the regression (2) regarding CoVaR changes support the previous findings from 
regression (1) that payment method, the status of targets and relative size are significant 
determinants of merger-related change in CoVaR.  
Regression (3) of table 7 only uses 451 mergers of U.S. banking acquirers to check the 
results on the relation between the acquirer as well as deal characteristics and the change in 
acquirers' MES when non-U.S. mergers are excluded. The relative size is again found to be 
statistically significant and negatively related to the merger-induced change in the acquirer's 
MES (at 5% level of confidence). Payment method, on the other hand, is not significant in this 
case. It indicates that the statistically significant coefficient of a payment method from 
regression (1) is affected by non-US acquirers. The regression also witnesses a positive and 
significant coefficient of too-big-to-fail motive (although weak at 10% level). This finding 
somehow signals that the destabilising effect of bank merger is caused by bank's desire to 
become too big to fail although the evidence is not strong enough. It is also in line with the 
result from Weiß et al., (2014) as they find that too-big-to-fail motive is one of the main factors 
that cause the increase in acquiring banks' contribution to systemic risk among large banks 
using MES model. The motivation to become SIFIs to exploit government safety net and 
bailouts urges banks to pursue even risky M&As or value-destroying merger deals, which in 
turns increase banks' contributions to systemic risk. In regression (3) of table 8, there is weak 
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evidence that small relative size contributes to an increase in U.S. acquirers’ CoVaR post-
merger. It is important to note that regression (3) in both tables for US acquirers possesses 
negative adjusted R-squared. It can be interpreted as merger-related changes in MES and 
CoVaR of US acquirers are insignificant. In other words, mergers do not affect US acquirers’ 
contribution to systemic risk. Also, US acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk could 
predominantly be driven by irrational contagion rather than acquirer or market fundamentals. 
In regression (4) of table 7, acquirer and deal characteristics, as well as macroeconomic 
variables for the respective acquirer' country, are used for the sample including non-US 
acquirers. Similar findings are found when payment method and relative size are a significant 
predictor of the acquirer's change in MES post-merger. Product diversification variable in the 
regression has negative and statistically significant coefficient (at 10% level). It indicates that 
product-diversifying deals help to decrease non-US acquirers' contribution to systemic risk 
following a merger. Therefore, the second hypothesis which projects that product-diversifying 
deals produce a systemic risk-reducing effect cannot be rejected. In regression (5) of table 8, 
the findings are consistent with the full sample regressions with payment method, and relative 
size are significant determinants of the change in non-US acquirers' CoVaR.  
Overall, the findings in all specifications based on acquirers’ MES and CoVaR 
confirms the results of the univariate test in the previous section. First, for deals financed by 
cash only, the acquirers' contribution to systemic risk is increasing. This study also considers 
other financing methods such as stock or stock and cash. Because payment method is a dummy 
variable; it indicates that deals financed by stock or stock and cash are associated with the 
decrease in acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. Second, the smaller the deal size in 
comparison with acquirers' market value, mergers will increase acquirers' contribution to 
systemic risk. Third, private targets prevent acquirers in realising the systemic risk-reduction 
effect. Also, product-diversifying deals produce a systemic risk-reducing effect for acquirers. 
Finally, the more stable a political environment and a more concentrated banking system in an 
acquirer' country before a merger, the higher the reduction of bidders' contribution to systemic 
risk will be.  
5.3 Robustness checks 
As can be seen, the results of this study are robust in both the univariate tests and in all 
specifications of the regressions using both systemic risk measures MES and CoVaR of 
acquirers because the findings are consistent in all analyses. To further verify the robustness of 
the results obtained in the empirical analysis, we conduct the following robustness check. Apart 
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from the acquirers’ CoVaR estimated based on multivariate GARCH-DCC model as in this 
paper, a further estimation method of CoVaR is conducted based on the standard quantile 
regression as in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). It is found that the conclusions are drawn 
from the OLS regressions with Huber–White standard errors with CoVaR estimated based on 
both quantile regression and GARCH-DCC model in the univariate test above remain 
unchanged.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the systemic risk implications of bank mergers covering 
the period from 1998 until 2015, six years after the 2007-09 global financial crisis. We find 
that mergers and acquisitions, on average, do not impact on the acquiring banks’ contribution 
to systemic risk regardless of the increased potential for risk diversification exhibited by cross-
border and cross-industry bank mergers. When examining the influence of potential factors 
that we anticipate having an impact on the change in bidding banks' contribution to systemic 
risk, payment method, the status of target, relative size, product diversification, HHI and 
political stability are all found to be significant determinants. 
Overall, the results convey a critical view of the risk-reduction potential of bank M&A. 
Bank mergers, at best, are risk neutral, yet offer substantial scope for increases in the likelihood 
of acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. If risk reductions tend not to materialise, but there 
is a clear possibility that the acquiring bank exhibits a higher contribution to systemic risk post-
M&A, it is necessary for banking supervisors to consider the aspect of financial stability as a 
further important criterion within the approval process for bank mergers. As the empirical 
findings indicate, especially mergers that financed by cash only, smaller relative size, as well 
as involved private targets, need to be carefully examined by regulators as these are particularly 
prone to destabilise the banking sector. Also, it is important that policy makers maintain a 
stable political environment so that bank mergers in such environment enhance the systemic 
stability of the banking sector. Future research should further look at the deal-induced risk 
implications of target characteristics in explaining the changes in bidders' contribution to 
systemic risk post-merger. Also, due to the fact that the data for worldwide surveys on bank 
regulation and supervision in Barth et al. (2013) are only available until 2012 from World 
Bank, a further study may examine the systemic risk effects of bank mergers on bidding banks 
taken the regulatory variables into account as control variables when more updated data 
become available.  
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Appendix A. Marginal Expected Shortfall 
A.1 Derivation of equation 3 
Starting with the expression for the expected loss of the financial system at time t 
𝐸𝑆𝑚𝑡(𝐶) = −𝔼𝑡−1(𝑟𝑚𝑡|𝑟𝑚𝑡 < 𝐶) (A.1) 
following Scaillet (2005), it is shown that the first order derivative for the weight associated 
with the ith asset, i.e. MES, is given by 
𝜕𝐸𝑆𝑚𝑡(𝐶)
𝜕𝑤𝑖
= 𝔼𝑡−1(𝑟𝑖𝑡|𝑟𝑚𝑡 < 𝐶) (A.2) 
For this, ?̆?𝑚𝑡 is the return for the financial system except for the contribution of the ith 
asset, where ?̆?𝑚𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑗≠𝑖 and 𝑟𝑚𝑡 = ?̆?𝑚𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 
Besides, the threshold C is not restricted to being a scalar. It is assumed to depend on 
the distribution of the market returns and hence on the weights and the specified probability to 
be in the tail of the distribution p, as in the case of the VaR (Gourieroux et al., 2000), thus 
providing a general proof for Eq. (A.2). It follows that: 
𝐸𝑆𝑚𝑡(𝐶) = 𝔼𝑡−1(?̆?𝑚𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡|?̆?𝑚𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 < 𝐶(𝑤𝑖 , 𝑝)) =
1
𝑝





𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡)𝑓(?̆?𝑚𝑡, 𝑟𝑖𝑡)𝑑?̆?𝑚𝑡)𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑡    (A.3) 





















𝑟𝑖𝑡) 𝐶(𝑤𝑖 , 𝑝)𝑓𝐶(𝑤𝑖 , 𝑝) − 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑖𝑡)𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑡 (A.4) 
However, the probability of being in the left tail of the distribution of the market return 
is constant, i.e. Pr(?̆?𝑚𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 < 𝐶) = 𝑝 
A direct implication of this fact is that the first order derivative of this probability is 
null. To put it differently, using simple calculus rules for cumulative distribution functions, it 
can be shown that (
𝜕𝐶(𝑤𝑖,𝑝)
𝜕𝑤𝑖
− 𝑟𝑖𝑡) 𝑓(𝐶(𝑤𝑖 , 𝑝) − 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑖𝑡) = 0 (A.5) 












𝔼𝑡−1(𝑟𝑖𝑡|?̆?𝑚𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 < 𝐶(𝑤𝑖 , 𝑝)) = 𝔼𝑡−1(𝑟𝑖𝑡|𝑟𝑚𝑡 < 𝐶) (A.6) 
which completes the proof. 
A.2 Derivation of equation 6 






𝜎𝑖𝑡𝜌𝑖𝑡 𝜎𝑖𝑡√1 − 𝜌𝑖𝑡2
) (A.7) 
Given Equation (4), the market and firm's returns can be expressed as: 
𝑟𝑚𝑡 = 𝜎𝑚𝑡𝜀𝑚𝑡 (B.2) 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝜎𝑖𝑡𝜌𝑖𝑡𝜀𝑚𝑡 +  𝜎𝑖𝑡√1 − 𝜌𝑖𝑡
2 𝜉𝑖𝑡 (A.8) 
For any conditioning event C: 




 𝜎𝑖𝑡√1 − 𝜌𝑖𝑡




which completes the proof.  
A.3 Tail expectations 
The tail expectations 𝔼𝑡−1 (𝜀𝑚𝑡|𝜀𝑚𝑡 <
𝐶
𝜎𝑚𝑡




can be easily estimated in a non-parametric kernel framework by elaborating on (Scaillet, 
2005). 
For ease of notation, let denote the systemic risk event 
𝐶
𝜎𝑚𝑡
 by k. The tail expectation 
on the market returns 𝔼𝑡−1 (𝜀𝑚𝑡|𝜀𝑚𝑡 <
𝐶
𝜎𝑚𝑡
), which becomes 𝔼𝑡−1(𝜀𝑚𝑡|𝜀𝑚𝑡 < 𝑘). (A.10) 
Using the definition of the conditional mean, (A.10) is rewritten as a function of the 
probability density function f 








To complete the proof, the numerator and denominator in (A.12) are computed. For 











where h stands for the bandwidth parameter, and T is the sample size (Silverman, 1986). 
Second, the probability of being in the tail of the distribution can be defined as the 
integral of the probability density function over the domain of definition of the variable u, i.e. 
𝑝 = Pr(𝑢 < 𝑘) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑘
−∞
. Consequently, by replacing 𝑓𝑢 with the kernel estimator, the 












The expectation in (A.10) hence takes the form 










Similarly, it can be shown that 











Appendix B. CoVaR 
B1. Derivation of equation 12 
Considering two cases: a general case with 𝜌𝑖𝑡 ≠ 0 and a special case with 𝜌𝑖𝑡= 0. Given 









For each conditioning event form ℂ (𝑟𝑖𝑡): 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶, CoVaR is defined as follows: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑟𝑚𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡










𝑚|𝑟𝑖𝑡=𝐶)|𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶) = 1 −  (A.17) 
In the special case where the conditional mean function of 𝜉𝑖𝑡 is linear in 𝑟𝑖𝑡, the first 
two conditional moments of 𝜉𝑖𝑡  given 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶 can be expressed as: 
𝔼(𝜉𝑖𝑡 |𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶) =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜉𝑖𝑡 ,𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝜎𝑖𝑡








∗ 𝐶 (A.18) 

























∗ 𝐶) |𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶] = 1 (A.21) 















∗ 𝐶) = 𝐺−1(1 − ) (A.22) 
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By rearranging these terms, we write the general expression of the CoVaR: 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑚|𝑟𝑖𝑡=𝐶 = −𝜎𝑚𝑡√1 − 𝜌𝑖𝑡2𝐺




The CoVaR defined for the conditioning event  
ℂ (𝑟𝑖𝑡): 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝑟𝑖𝑡) has a similar expression: 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑚|𝑟𝑖𝑡=𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝑟𝑖𝑡) = −𝜎𝑚𝑡√1 − 𝜌𝑖𝑡2𝐺




where F (:) denotes the marginal cdf of the firm return. Then, for each conditioning event form 








=𝛾𝑖𝑡 ∗ [𝐶 − 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝑟𝑖𝑡)] (A.26) 
where 𝛾𝑖𝑡= 𝜎𝑚𝑡𝜌𝑖𝑡/𝜎𝑖𝑡 denotes the time-varying linear projection coefficient of the market 
return on the firm return. If the marginal distribution of 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is symmetric around zero, then 




∗ 𝐶 = 𝛾𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶 (A.27) 
As in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), CoVaR denoted 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() and defined for a 
conditioning event ℂ (𝑟𝑖𝑡): 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() is:  
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() = 𝛾𝑖𝑡[𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() - 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡(0.5)] (A.28) 
or 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() = 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() (A.29) 
if the marginal distribution of the firm return is symmetric around zero. Considering the case 
where 𝜌𝑖𝑡 = 0 and the bivariate process becomes: 
𝑟𝑚𝑡 = 𝜎𝑚𝑡𝜀𝑚𝑡(A.30) 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝜎𝑖𝑡𝜉𝑚𝑡(A.31) 
(𝜀𝑚𝑡 , 𝜉𝑚𝑡)~𝐷(A.32) 
where 𝑣𝑡 = (𝜀𝑚𝑡 , 𝜉𝑚𝑡)
′ satisfies 𝔼(𝑣𝑡) = 0 and 𝔼(𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑡
′) = 𝐼2 and D denotes the bivariate 
distribution of the standardized innovations. It is straightforward to show that: 
𝑃𝑟 (𝑟𝑚𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑚|𝑟𝑖𝑡=𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡()|𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡()) = 𝑃𝑟 (𝑟𝑚𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑚|𝑟𝑖𝑡=𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡()) =  
(A.33) 
Hence, we have 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() = 𝜎𝑚𝑡𝐹𝑚
−1() and 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑡() = 0 where 𝐹𝑚(. ) denotes the 
cdf of the marginal distribution of the standardized market return. 
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Appendix C. Variable definition 






































Merger-related change in ∆CoVaR Bloomberg, 
own 
calculation 
Acquirer and deal characteristics 
Payment 
method 
Equals 1 if the deal is fully financed by cash (zero 
otherwise) 
Bloomberg 
Status of target Equals 1 if the target is a private firm (zero otherwise) Bloomberg 
Deal size Natural logarithm of the deal value (in millions of US 
dollar) 
Bloomberg 
Relative size Ratio of the deal value to the acquirer's market value the 









Equals 1 if the acquirer and the target do not share the 
same four-digit ICB1 code (0 otherwise) 
Bloomberg 
ROA Pre-tax profits over total assets (%) Bloomberg 
Market to book 
ratio 
Market-to-book ratio (%) Bloomberg 
                                                      
1 The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is an industry classification taxonomy 
owned by FTSE. The ICB is used globally to divide the market into increasingly specific 
categories, allowing investors to compare industry trends between well-defined 
subsectors. The ICB uses a system of 10 industries, partitioned into 19 super-sectors, 
which are further divided into 41 sectors, which then contain 114 subsectors. 
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Leverage Long-term debt over total assets (%) Bloomberg 
Operating 
efficiency 
Ratio of operating costs over total assets (%) Bloomberg 
Capital ratio Book value of equity over total assets (%) Bloomberg 
Acquirers' total 
assets 





High-risk banks The pre-merger default risk of acquirers, which takes the 
value of 1 for banks in the first distance to default quartile 
(i.e. banks with the highest level of pre-merger default 






GDP Annual real GDP growth rate (in %) Bloomberg 
HHI Herfindahl–Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the 
squared market shares of a country’s domestic and 
foreign banks 
* WITS, 
World Bank  
Political 
stability 
This indicator measures the perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violence. Indicator ranges from (-2.5) 
to 




Rule of Law The Rule of Law indicator measures the individual’s 
degree of confidence in rules of society and the likelihood 
of crime and violence. The scores range between -2.5 and 
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